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NOTE: This article highlights some of the
research findings that have been published in
The Decline in Employment of People with
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle, which the
Upjohn Institute will publish in August.
Stapleton and Burkhauser edited the book,
which examines the changes in social policies
that contributed to the employment decline of
people with disabilities.

T

he transition of single women
with children off the welfare rolls and into
employment (see Figures 1 and 2) in the
1990s has been described as “stunning”
by leading policy researchers (see, for
instance, Blank 2002). The authors in The
Decline in Employment of People with
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (Stapleton
and Burkhauser 2003) document and
analyze an equally stunning transition of
working-age people with disabilities out
of the workforce and onto disability
income support programs (see Figures 1
and 2), despite the upsurge in government
rhetoric proclaiming increased
employment and economic independence
as a primary policy goal. Employment
and program participation trends for both
populations departed sharply from trends
in the prior decade.
Single Women with Children
At the heart of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 is
the expectation that parents of both sexes
will work to support their families if
necessary, and will rely on welfare only

as a temporary last resort. That
expectation has evolved over the past few
decades as more and more women,
including mothers of young children,
have entered the labor force. It is
embedded in many features of welfare
reform, including time limits, work effort
requirements, a shift in employment
programs away from investment in
human capital toward employment as
soon as possible (“work first”), child care
subsidies, block grants to states that
create incentives to reduce caseloads by

There is no dispute about the
growth in reliance of workingage people with disabilities on
SSDI and SSI.

helping parents enter employment, and
better access to health care for lowincome parents who work.
Welfare reform is just one of three
major forces that contributed to the
employment and program participation
trends of single mothers. The second is
the dramatic expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), a wage
subsidy that helps employers pay lowskilled parents more than they would be
willing to in the absence of the credit. The
large increase in the EITC for families
“made work pay” for many parents with
low skills. Previous efforts to increase pay

have focused on the minimum wage—a
policy that imposes costs on employers.
The third force was strong economic
growth. Researchers widely agree that
welfare reform, the EITC, and the
economy all played significant roles,
although they disagree about their relative
contributions (Blank 2002; Moffitt 2002;
Besharov 2003; Hotz and Scholz
forthcoming).
Most single mothers with children
have experienced growth in household
income as a result of these changes. Blank
(2002) documents that the poverty rates
of single, female householders fell from
32.2 percent in the business cycle peak
year of 1989 to 24.7 percent by 2000. It is
important to recognize, however, that the
economic circumstances of mothers least
capable of working might have
deteriorated.
Policymakers increased employment
of single mothers with children by
consistently shifting program incentives
to favor earnings from work over benefits
from not working, using a combination of
carrots and sticks. Single women with
children are now expected to work.
Policymakers also changed the
expectations of program gatekeepers with
respect to how success was measured.
Program success is now defined as the
integration of single women with children
into the labor force.
Despite the caseload decline, both total
government spending on low-income
families (including spending for the
EITC, health care, child care, and many
other supports) and the number of
families receiving some support have
continued to grow (Besharov 2003, pp.
17–19). These changes remain politically
popular, however, because support is now
tied to work.
Working-Age People with Disabilities
The 1990 passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a major
victory for those who believe that
working-age people with disabilities
should be fully integrated into society,
including the workforce. The intellectual
underpinnings of this belief are that the
most promising path to economic
independence is through market work,
and that the social environment is a more
3
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Figure 1 Employment Trends for Working-Age Mothers and People with
Disabilities
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Income (SSI). These trends represent a
real phenomenon, not an illusion.
The remaining chapters in the book
focus on the causes of the employment
decline. We conclude that changes in
social policies are responsible. The most
likely explanation is SSDI/SSI program
expansions. Starting in 1984, and
continuing into the early 1990s, access to
benefits was eased. In addition, the value
of SSDI benefits increased relative to
wages for workers with low wages. There
is convincing evidence that increases in
the SSDI rolls closely track the
employment of those who say they cannot
work (Bound and Waidmann 2002), and
that access expanded primarily for the
two impairment groups (musculoskeletal
and psychiatric) that also account for a
very large share of growth in those
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There is much controversy
about the ADA’s effect on the
employment of people with
disabilities.

SOURCE: Tabulations from the Current Population Survey. Series for women with children are for
women ages 20–65. Series for men and women with disabilities are for persons ages 25–61.

powerful factor in determining
employment outcomes than is an
individual’s impairment. Policymakers
and advocates now embrace the notion
that environment rather than impairment
is critical to employment outcomes for the
majority of people with disabilities. Yet
the implications of this insight with
respect to the role of public policy in
determining these outcomes have not
been broadly recognized or acted upon.
The consequences are the decline in
employment, and increase in economic
dependence, of people with disabilities.
The evidence of an employment rate
decline itself is controversial, in part
because it is so difficult to believe that a
decline could occur despite the ADA and
the economic expansion. Although use of
the Current Population Survey (CPS) data
to document trends for single women with
children is accepted without question, the
use of these same data to document trends
for people with disabilities is hotly
debated. In fact, the National Council on
4

Disability recently recommended that
“the Federal Government should not
encourage or support the dissemination of
employment data until a methodology for
assessing employment rates among
people with disabilities that is acceptable
to leading researchers and demographers
in the field and credible to persons with
disabilities can be developed” (National
Council on Disability 2002, p. 20).
One chapter in The Decline in
Employment of People with Disabilities:
A Policy Puzzle demonstrates that,
although the use of a work-limitation
question in the CPS is flawed as a
measure of disability, the employment
trends based on these data are very similar
to those based on other disability
measures (severe impairment, housework
limitations, etc.) in other data sets defined
consistently over time. There is no
dispute about the growth in the reliance of
working-age people with disabilities on
Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) and Supplemental Security

reporting inability to work at all and
growth in the number of low-wage
workers on the SSDI rolls was much
greater than for others (Autor and Duggan
2003).
In contrast to welfare reforms, the
SSDI/SSI expansions have reinforced
both the flawed premise that people with
disabilities “cannot work,” and the
message that “government will help as
long as they do not help themselves.” The
work disincentives of these programs and
associated health insurance benefits did
not change during this period, and there
was no substantial increase in work
supports. The 1999 Ticket to Work
program and the Work Incentives
Improvement Act partially address work
supports and disincentives, but in ways
that are minor by comparison to the
welfare reforms. Work requirements,
time limits, and work-first policies are yet
to be tried. The Ticket to Work program
does create incentives for frontline
rehabilitation workers to promote return
to work and program exit, but this hardly
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Figure 2 Program Participation Trends for Working-Age Mothers and People with
Disabilities
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explanation (Figures 1 and 2), but, as we
discuss, the “obvious” conclusion might
well be wrong because of both the
complex dynamics of the SSDI/SSI
expansion and the effect of the 1990–
1991 recession.
Whether the ADA has contributed to
the decline in the employment rates of
working-age people with disabilities is
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SOURCE: AFDC/TANF Households (average monthly caseload in fiscal year) 1980–2000:
Department of Health and Human Services, “2002 Indicators of Welfare Dependence,” Appendix
A, available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators02/appa-tanf.htm>; for fiscal year 2001: Agency
for Children and Families, “Average Monthly Number of Families Fiscal Year 2001,” available at
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/familiesL.htm>. SSDI workers: Social Security Administration, “Annual Report of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2001,” available at
<http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2001/sect1b.html#table16>. SSI: recipients of
federally administered payments age 18–64 in December of year, SSA, “SSI Annual Statistical
Report, Table 3,” available at <http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2001/
sect2.html>. All Web pages accessed 5/20/2003.

compares to the incentives for states and
local caseworkers created by welfare
reform block grants. At a time when work
outcomes for clients have become a
dominant measure of performance for
welfare caseworkers, they are hardly on
the radar screens of frontline staff in SSA
field offices and state Disability
Determination Services.
The second policy change we focus on
in our book is the ADA itself. There is
much controversy about the ADA’s effect
on the employment of people with
disabilities. DeLeire, in his chapter
reviewing the evidence developed
primarily by himself and Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001), argues that, although the
ADA is likely to have increased job

duration of those with disabilities who are
already working, a lack of enforcement
with respect to new hires, coupled with
the cost of accommodations, substantially
reduced overall employment of people
with disabilities. Consistent with his
conclusion, he reports that 1) employment
declines for workers with disabilities in
medium-sized firms were greater than in
smaller firms that were exempt from the
ADA and in large firms where the costs of
compliance are smaller; 2) relatively high
employment declines in states where
ADA enforcement actions are relatively
high; and 3) declines in employment even
after excluding SSDI beneficiaries from
the sample. The timing of the aggregate
employment and program trends certainly

debatable, as is the ADA’s importance
relative to expansions of SSDI/SSI.
Given the evidence, however, it would be
very hard to make the case that the ADA
increased employer demand for workers
with disabilities, as many hoped it would.
The ADA was the only significant
attempt to stimulate employer demand for
workers with disabilities during this
period. The ADA contrasts sharply with
the EITC, the method used to increase
employer demand for low-income
parents. The EITC clearly benefits
employers, while the ADA imposes a
burden on them. As much as the ADA
might be necessary to protect the rights of
people with disabilities, we doubt that it
can ever be an effective tool for
increasing employer demand for workers
with disabilities.
Conclusion
In many respects, recent developments
in employment policy for people with
disabilities are reminiscent of previous
unsuccessful efforts to increase the
employment and economic independence
of single women with children. Both
focused on investing in the human capital
of their target populations through
education, training, and rehabilitation;
both sought to reduce the extent to which
income and in-kind benefits are taxed
away as earnings are increased, but fell
far short of making work pay; neither
built in work expectations; and both
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sought to increase employer demand
through approaches that impose costs on
employers.
This suggests that disability policy
should follow in the footsteps of policy
for single women with children, namely
1) building work expectations and
incentives into income support programs;
and 2) stimulating employer demand
through subsidies. That conclusion is too
simple, however, because it ignores
another welfare reform lesson: pro-work
policies will not help—and could harm—
those who are least capable of working.
This is a much more prominent concern
for people with disabilities than for single
women with children. Many people with
disabilities cannot work at levels
comparable to those expected of others,
and there remain many who cannot work,
or whom we would not expect to work,
under any reasonable circumstances.
Crafting policies that increase
employment and economic independence
through work for many while adequately
protecting those least able to work is a
more serious challenge for disability
policy than for family welfare policy.
Yet, to ignore the lessons of welfare
reform for the sake of protecting those
who are least capable of working exposes
people with disabilities to another risk,
and ignores another lesson of welfare
reform. That risk is the possibility that a
future Congress and administration, faced
with growing demands to control
program growth, will do so by limiting
access to, and reducing income benefits.
Similar pressures led to substantial
cutbacks in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Political support for policies that
embody the message “we will help you,
but we expect you to help yourself to the
extent you reasonably can, and we will
reward you for doing so” is much more
likely to be sustained than political
support for current policy.
David C. Stapleton is director of the
Cornell Center for Policy Research.
Richard V. Burkhauser is department chair
of the College of Human Ecology at
Cornell University.
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Evaluating Participant
Self-Evaluation
Jeffrey Smith and Alexander Whalley
University of Maryland
In recent years, participant selfevaluations have gained attention as a
complement, or substitute for,
experimental or econometric evaluations.
Participant evaluation has two
advantages: 1) participants have a lot of
information on outcomes and costs not
available to program evaluators, and 2)
self-evaluations cost very little relative to
expensive econometric evaluations. The
purpose of this research is to empirically
assess the accuracy of self-evaluation
versus experimental evaluation of
programs. The major hypothesis is that
participants may not be very good in
generating the counterfactuals required
for proper evaluation.
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